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The Hague Convention and Domestic
Violence: Proposals for Balancing the
Policies of Discouraging Child Abduction
and Protecting Children from Domestic
Violence
SHANI M. KING*
I. Introduction
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (the Convention)' was enacted in response to a pattern of
parental abduction across international borders to thwart or preempt cus-
tody arrangements in one country and seek a more advantageous setting
for litigating custody issues in another. Consequently, the Convention was
designed to discourage the abduction of children across international bor-
ders and to encourage respect for custody and access arrangements in
countries from which children were abducted.2 To implement the
* Professor of Law and Co-director of the Center on Children and Families at the
University of Florida Levin College of Law. Professor King is an expert in international human
rights, children's rights, and family law with a particular interest in the rights of children and
families from traditionally underserved populations.
1. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, available at http://www.hcch.net/indexen. php?
act=text.display&tid=2 1.
2. Article I of the Convention describes its objects as:
a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any
Contracting State; and
b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are
effectively respected in the other Contracting States.
For commentary on the Convention see generally Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report on
the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention (1982), available at www.hcch.net/indexen.php?
act=text.display&tid=21; 3 Conference de la Haye de droit international priv6, Actes et
Documents de la Quatorzibme session, Enlbvement d'enfants 426 (1982) ("Prez-Vera
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Convention, the United States enacted the International Child Abduction
Remedies Act (ICARA) on April 29, 1988.3
Much has been written in recent years about the conflict between the
Convention and laws designed to protect children from parental abuse or
domestic violence,' in part due to growing evidence that a majority of
return cases are brought by men against women,' many involving women
alleging that they are fleeing with their children from domestic abuse. 6
This article explores ways of correcting an imbalance that favors the pol-
icy of preventing child abduction at the expense of exposing children to
Report"), available at www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf, and Department of State Public Notice
957 (Mar. 26, 1986); Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal
Analysis, Department of State Public Notice 957, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494 (Mar. 26, 1986) (designed
to "assist the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the full Senate in their consideration
of the Convention," in particular Appendix C "Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction"), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdflLegal
_Analysisof .the Convention.pdf.
3. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq. (2006); State
Department regulations can be found at 22 C.F.R § 9 (1989); 53 Fed. Reg. 23608 (June 23,
1988).
4. See TARYN LINDHORST & JEFFREY L. EDLESON, BATTERED WOMEN, THEIR CHILDREN,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION
CONVENTION (2012). This book reports on a study of the cases of twenty-two women who had
a petition filed against them for wrongful removal and reported that they were in a situation that
could be construed as domestic violence. See also Merle H. Weiner, International Child
Abduction and the Escape from Domestic Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593 (2000); Roxanne
Hoegger, What If She Leaves? Domestic Violence Cases Under the Hague Convention and the
Insufficiency of the Undertakings Remedy, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 181 (2003); Merle H.
Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and Progress: The Need for Purposive
Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33
COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 275 (2002); Noah L. Browne, Relevance and Fairness: Protecting
the Rights of Domestic-Violence Victims and Left-Behind Fathers Under the Hague Convention
on International Child Abduction, 60 DUKE L. J. 1193 (2011); John Caldwell, Child Abduction
Cases: Evaluating Risks to the Child and the Convention, 23 (2) N.Z. U. L. REv. 161 (2008);
Annette Lopez, Creating Hope for Child Victims ofDomestic Violence in Political Asylum Law:
Comment, 35(3) U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 603 (2004); Carol S. Bruch, The Unmet Needs of
Domestic Violence Victims and Their Children in Hague Child Abduction Convention Cases,
GP SOLO MAGAZINE (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ newslet-
ter/publiccations/gp-solo-magazine-home/gp solo-magazineindex/unmetneeds.html. See
also Catherine Norris, Immigration and Abduction: The Relevance of U.S. Immigration Status
to Defenses Under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 98 CAL. L. REV.
159 (2010).
5. See Nigel Lowe, A Statistical Analysis ofApplications Made in 2008 Under the Hague
Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (2011)
available at www.hcch.net; Preliminary Document No. 8A, "Child Abduction Section" under
"Special Commissions" (finding that 69% of taking persons were mothers and 28% of the tak-
ing persons were fathers).
6. Weiner, Navigating the Road, supra note 4, (citing Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Collated Responses to the Questionnaire Concerning the Practical
Operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, at 309-19 (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abd-pd
02efs2006.pdf.
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domestic violence and makes recommendations for standardizing the out-
comes of cases in U.S. courts involving allegations of parental abuse or
other domestic violence, given a concerning trend of ad hoc and inconsis-
tent results in cases decided under the Convention.
II. Determining "Grave Risk of Harm" Under the Convention
While the objective of the Convention is to secure the prompt return of
children wrongfully removed or retained by a parent, the drafters built in
certain exceptions.' Among these exceptions is the provision in article
13(b) that authorities are not bound to order the return of a child if it is
established that "there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose
the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in
an intolerable situation." Despite this exception, however, the Convention
and ICARA favor returning children to their habitual residences.'
Contracting States are required to "take all appropriate measures to secure
within their territories the implementation of the objects of the
Convention," using "the most expeditious procedures available."o
Moreover, regulators and courts have developed a theory of the narrowness
of the exceptions, which is often seized on in ordering return." Numerous
7. See Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report, supra note 2, at para. 25:
[I]t has to be admitted that the removal of the child can sometimes be justified by objective rea-
sons which have to do either with its person, or with the environment with which it is most
closely connected. Therefore the Convention recognizes the need for certain exceptions to the
general obligations assumed by States to secure the prompt return of children who have been
unlawfully removed or retained.
8. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 13(b); see also, Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report,
supra note 2, para. 29:
Thus, the interest of the child in not being removed from its habitual residence without suffi-
cient guarantees of its stability in the new environment, gives way before the primary interest
of any person in not being exposed to physical or psychological danger or being placed in an
intolerable situation.
Among other issues that may arise in courts deciding whether or not to return a child include
the definition of "custody" and whether custody was being exercised prior to the taking (art. 3),
the definition of "habitual residence" (art. 3 and 4) and the weight to be given to the views of
the older child (art. 13, para. 2).
9. Note that while under ICARA, the applicant for return of the child need only establish
the case by a preponderance of the evidence, the respondent opposing such return on the basis
of article 13's risk-of-harm exception must establish his or her case by clear and convincing evi-
dence. ICARA, supra note 3, at 11603(e).
10. Hague Convention, supra note 1, article 2.
11. See, e.g., Public Notice 957, supra note 2, at 10509-10, ("In drafting articles 13 and 20,
the representatives of countries participating in negotiations on the Convention were aware that
any exceptions had to be drawn very narrowly lest their application undermine the express pur-
poses of the Convention-to effect the prompt return of abducted children.") See also ICARA
supra note 3, § 11601(a)(4). ("Children who are wrongfully removed or retained within the
meaning of the Convention are to be promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions set
forth in the Convention applies.") Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2000) ("The logic,
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cases have warned that construing an exception to the principle of return
too broadly would risk "swallowing the rule."' 2
In the United States under ICARA, the respondent must prove a "grave
risk of exposure to physical or psychological harm," or of placing the child
in an "intolerable situation" by clear and convincing evidence.13 There is no
guidance as to what sorts of evidence should be provided. Courts, therefore,
address each case on an ad hoc basis, using whatever evidence is presented
within the timeframe prescribed by the Convention.14 The result has been
that differences in outcomes and remedies are pervasive in these cases.
These differences in outcomes and remedies are not surprising, as
courts face several complex issues in weighing whether a grave risk of
harm exists. Courts often must determine the level of abuse that presents
a grave risk of harm;" whether and to what extent domestic abuse in the
household (e.g., abuse of spouse) creates psychological harm to the
child;' 6 whether the grave risk of harm, if established, can be mitigated in
some way" (e.g., by returning a child with undertakings by the parent to
purpose, and text of the Convention all mean that such harms are not per se the type of psy-
chological harm contemplated by the narrow exception under article 13(b)."); see also Van De
Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2005); Norinder v. Fuentes, 657 F.3d 526;
Vazquez v. Estrada, 2011 WL 196164 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2011).
12. Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2007); Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028 (9th
Cir. 2005).
13. See ICARA, supra note 3, § 11603(e).
14. ICARA, supra note 3. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 11. Article 11 provides:
The judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in pro-
ceedings for the return of children. If the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not
reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings, the
applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State, on its own initiative or if asked by
the Central Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to request a statement of the
reasons for the delay. If a reply is received by the Central Authority of the requested State, that
Authority shall transmit the reply to the Central Authority of the requesting State, or to the
applicant, as the case may be.
15. Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 2001).
In other words, at one end of the spectrum are those situations where repatriation might cause
inconvenience or hardship, eliminate certain educational or economic opportunities, or not
comport with the child's preferences; at the other end of the spectrum are those situations in
which the child faces a real risk of being hurt, physically or psychologically, as a result of repa-
triation. The former do not constitute a grave risk of harm under Article 13(b); the latter do.
16. See, e.g., Whallon, 230 F.3d at 460 (finding that one instance of shoving wife and ver-
bal abuse of wife and older daughter did not entail grave risk, distinguishing Walsh, where the
court found that a pattern of abuse did constitute grave risk to the child observing the abuse).
See also Elyashiv v. Elyashiv, 353 F. Supp. 2d 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Application of Adan,
437 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2006); Charalambous v. Charalambous, 627 F.3d 462 (1st Cir. 2010);
Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (E.D. Wash. 2001). The social science on
the effect of spousal abuse on a child has evolved substantially in recent decades, see LINDHORST
& EDLESON, BATrERED WOMEN, supra, note 4, Foreword, p. x.
17. See Blondin, 238 F.3d at 162.
In cases of serious abuse, before a court may deny repatriation on the ground that a grave risk
of harm exists under Article 13(b), it must examine the full range of options that might make
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whom he or she is returned"8 or stipulating protections to be provided by
local authorities); whether the foreign courts, police, or other authorities
are competent or willing to protect the child;1 9 and whether it is appropri-
ate for a court to attempt to assess such competence or willingness.20 One
of the more unsettling concerns about domestic violence is the discretion
to return a child even if "grave risk of harm" is proved, if return would
advance the purposes of the Convention. 2 1
Not surprisingly, the difficulties with determining "grave risk of harm"
start with the fact that the term is not well defined. In the United States,
there is a certain amount of unanimity on what should not determine
whether "grave risk" exists, including: the best interests of child;22 the
child's happiness; 23 the relative fitness of the parents; the U.S. court's rel-
possible the safe return of a child to the home country.
See also Maurizio v. L.C., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93 (Ct. App. 2011).
18. Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d at 608 (6th Cir. 2007) (in serious cases undertakings and
the like are unlikely to be sufficient, and "Where a grave risk of harm has been established,
ordering return with feckless undertakings is worse than not ordering it at all."); Gaudin, 415
F.3d at 1028; Maurizio, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 93.
19. Miltiadous v. Tetervak, 686 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Pa., 2010) (Cypriot courts not able
to protect); In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381 (on remand, DC found insufficient evi-
dence that Argentina cannot protect); Stevens v. Stevens, 499 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. Mich.
2007) (court in Scotland was not incapable or unwilling to give child adequate protection).
20. See Khan v. Fatima, 680 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2012); Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340
(11th Cir. 2008); Danaipour v. McLarey, 386 F.3d 289 (1st Cir. 2004).
21. Under article 13(b) of the Convention, "the judicial or administrative authority of the
requested State is not bound [emphasis added] to order the return of the child" in the circum-
stances enumerated" and under article 18, "The provisions of this Chapter [III, Return of
Children] do not limit the power of a judicial or administrative authority to order the return of
the child at any time." See also Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report, supra note 2, at para. 113;
Public Notice 957, supra, note 2, at 10509; Tsai-Yi Ynag v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 499 F.3d 259 (3d
Cir. 2007); Habrzyk v. Habrzyk, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (N.D. Ill. 2011); McManus v. McManus,
354 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69-70 (D. Mass. 2005); Carrasco v. Carrillo-Castro, 862 F. Supp. 2d 1262
(D.N.M. 2012); Ibarra v. Quintanilla Garcia, 476 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D. Tex. Houston Div.,
2007); Haimdas v. Haimdas, 720 F. Supp. 2d 183 (E.D. N.Y. 2010); Maurizio v. L.C., 135 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 93, 113 (Ct. App. 2011) (in which grave risk of harm was found but, "Nevertheless, in
this case, under the Hague Convention, there is no question that Leo must be returned to Italy
for custody proceedings. The only issue is how his return can be accomplished with a minimum
amount of harm to the child").
22. Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that this is not the kind of psy-
chological harm that the Convention is talking about, the court added: "To conclude otherwise
would risk substituting a best interest of the child analysis to the analysis the Convention
requires"); but see Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Simply put, the Convention
is not intended to promote the return of a child to his or her country of habitual residency irre-
spective of that child's best interests; rather, the Convention embodies the judgment that in most
instances, a child's welfare is best served by a prompt return to that country"); Perez-Vera,
Explanatory Report, supra note 2 at paras. 23 and 25.
23. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1996).
The exception for grave harm to the child is not license for a court in the abducted-to country
to speculate on where the child would be happiest. That decision is a custody matter, and
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ative competence to determine custody vis-h-vis a foreign court; 24 the
U.S. court's disapproval of a foreign court's resolution of a custody dis-
pute; the child's economic well-being;2 5 and rising violence (short of war)
in the home country.2 6 Yet, there is an unsettling amount of variation in
how courts define or determine that risk. This variation is compounded by
the fact that courts are often faced with little objective evidence of the risk
of harm to the child and are therefore forced to rely in large part on the
credibility of the parties.
Similar difficulties in defining "grave risk of harm" have been seen in
Convention cases in other parts of the world, 27 and conferences dealing
with the operation of the Convention have sought to address these difficul-
ties. Judicial conferences dealing with Hague Convention cases, for
example, have regularly stressed the deterrent purpose of the Convention,
the necessity of construing exceptions narrowly28 and the usefulness of
reserved to the court in the country of habitual residence.
See also Habrzyk, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
24. See Danaipour v. McLarey, 386 F.3d 289 (1st Cir. 2004); Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340
(11th Cir. 2004); Khan v. Fatima, 680 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2012); Stevens v. Stevens, 499 F.
Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. Mich. 2007); Miltiadous v. Tetervak, 686 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Pa., 2010)
(on remedies available in foreign courts); Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 1995);
Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1060.
25. U.S. Dep't of State, Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10510 (Mar. 1986).
A review of deliberations on the Convention reveals that "intolerable situation" was not intend-
ed to encompass return to a home where money is in short supply, or where educational or
other opportunities are more limited than in the requested State.
26. Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 2010) (requiring zone of war, famine, or
disease); Freier v. Freier, 969 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Silverman v. Silverman, 338
F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) (Israel is not a zone of war.).
27. See, e.g., M.R. and L.R v. Estonia, 13420 Eur. Ct. H.R. 12 (2012); Lipkowsky and
McCormack v. Germany, 26755 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10 (2011) (requiring exceptions for not return-
ing a child under the Hague Convention to be interpreted strictly).
28. See, e.g., Hague Conference on Private International Law, Ruwenberg, Judges'
Seminar on International Protection of the Child (June 3-6, 2000), available at www.hcch.net/
upload/deruwen e.pdf (France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands).
The "grave risk" defense in Article 13(b) of the Convention has generally been narrowly con-
strued. It is in keeping with the objectives of the Convention, as confirmed in the Explanatory
Report by Elisa Prez-Vera, to interpret this defence in a restrictive fashion.
See also Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Latin American Judges' Seminar
on the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
Exceptional Nature of Defenses (Dec. 14, 2004), available at www.hcch.net/upload/monterrey2
.pdf [herinafter Judges' Seminar.]
The exceptional nature of the defenses under Articles 13 and 20 of the Convention is empha-
sized. The "grave risk" defense under Article 13(l)(b) should, in keeping with the Perez-Vera,
Explanatory Report, be narrowly interpreted. Any tendency to give a broad interpretation to
that article undermines the operation of the Convention.
See also Hague Conference on Private International Law, Second Meeting of Government
Experts, Inter-American Program of Cooperation for the Prevention and Remedy of Cases of
International Abduction of Children by One of Their Parents, Report of Roundtable 3, Model
Rules of Procedure for the International Return of Children (Sept. 19-21, 2007), available at
The Hague Convention and Domestic Violence 305
conditions, undertakings, and the like in facilitating return.2 9
In 2011 and 2012, the Hague Conference on Private International Law
(HCPIL) identified "domestic violence allegations and return proceed-
ings" as one of its themes, noting that domestic violence issues have
increasingly been raised as an area of concern in case law and academic
literature. 30 The meeting report discusses at length the deliberations on the
issue, identifying as one of the difficult challenges, how to achieve a bal-
ance "between the need to maintain expeditious procedures and to avoid
examination of the merits of the underlying custody dispute while also
allowing proper consideration of a defence under Article 13(b)." 3 1 In addi-
tion to examining how to define domestic violence in the context of
Article 13(b), HCPIL considered protective measures that could facilitate
safe return and ways to promote consistency in judicial outcomes in these
cases. HCPIL concluded that numerous jurisdictions were dealing with
return cases involving allegations of domestic violence and affirmed its
support for promoting consistency in how such cases were handled.32 It
discussed three proposals for promoting consistency in the interpretation
and application of article 13(b): (i) drafting guides to good practice for the
www.hcch.net/upload/iap28_3.pdf (2007).
18.2. Safe return. The court may not refuse the return of the child in reliance on Article 13(b)
of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction or Article
11(b) of the Inter-American Convention on the International Return of Children of 1989 if it is
shown that appropriate measures have been taken to ensure the protection of the child after the
return.
29. See Judges' Seminar, supra note 28.
A refusal to return a child on the basis of Article 13(b) should not be contemplated unless all
the available alternative methods of protecting the child have been considered by the court and
found to be inadequate.
Note, however, another conclusion of this Seminar:
5. Protection of the returning child when considering measures to protect a child who is the sub-
ject of a return order (and where appropriate an accompanying parent), a court should have
regard to the enforceability of those measures within the country to which the child is to be
returned. In this context, attention is drawn to the value of safe-return orders (including "mir-
ror" orders) made in that country before the child's return.
See also, however, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Nov. 28-Dec. 3, 2005, The
Hague Project for International Co-operation and the Protection of Children, Operation of the
Hague Children's Conventions and Cross-Border Protection of Children within Latin America,
available at www.hcch.net/upload/judseminar2005_e.pdf.
2. Particularly, within the 1980 Convention, it was recognized that when deciding on a child
abduction case, the requested Judge should trust that the Judicial Authorities of the requesting
State will take care of the due protection of the child, and where necessary the accompanying
parent, once the child is returned.
30. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Report of Part I of the Sixth Meeting
of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction
Convention and the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention, 4-6 JUDGES' NEWSLETTER ON
CHILD PROTECTION, Vol. XVIII (2012), available at www.hcch.net/upload/newsletter/nl2012
tome I 8e-p02.pdf.
31. Id. para. 4.
32. Id. part 1, paras. 35-37.
306 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 47, Number 2, Summer 2013
implementation of article 13(b); (ii) establishing a working group of
judges "to consider the feasibility of developing an appropriate tool to
assist in the consideration of the grave risk of harm exception;" and (iii)
establishing a group of experts "to develop principles or a practice guide
on the management of domestic violence allegations in Hague return pro-
ceedings."33
III. The Existing Imbalance between the Policies of Preventing
Child Abduction and Protecting Children from Domestic Violence
In its implementation of the Convention, the United States has favored
and focused on preventing child abduction, possibly at the expense of pro-
tecting children from domestic violence. Implementation in the United
States involves both executive and judicial functions. The United States
Department of State Office of Children's Issues (OCI) is the Central
Authority that has the primary executive responsibility for handling
incoming cases under the Convention in which a parent abducts a child
into the United States.34 As the Central Authority, OCI's principal charge
is to secure the return of the child. Under article 7 of the Convention, the
Central Authority is required to cooperate with others in securing the
return of children and, inter alia:
f) to initiate or facilitate the institution of judicial or administrative proceedings
with a view to obtaining the return of the child and, in a proper case, to make
arrangements for organising or securing the effective exercise of rights of
access;
g) where the circumstances so require, to provide or facilitate the provision of
legal aid and advice, including the participation of legal counsel and advisers;
h) to provide such administrative arrangements as may be necessary and appro-
priate to secure the safe return of the child....
On the judicial side, under section 11603(a) of ICARA, state courts and
federal district courts have concurrent original jurisdiction of actions aris-
ing under the Convention.
Procedurally, applicants for the return of a child (petitioners) and par-
ties opposing return (respondents) are treated unequally in a number of
significant respects. Under the Convention and ICARA, the petitioner
need only present his or her case for return by a preponderance of the
evidence, whereas the respondent must provide clear and convincing
evidence of the grave risk of harm or intolerable situation. Furthermore,
The Hague has carefully delineated the information to be included in an
application for return" and a number of countries, including the United
33. Id. para. 38. (same)
34. The Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 6.
35. Id. art. 8.
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States, explain explicitly what information is required to provide legal or
factual justification for an application.3 6 The Hague and the United States
have promulgated a model form of application for return,37 whereas this
type of assistance is not provided to respondents.
Further betraying the focus on return, ICARA facilitates assistance in
obtaining and paying for counsel for petitioners, but not for respondents.
Indeed, although States are not permitted to charge any expenses, includ-
ing legal fees and courts costs to the petitioner, the United States has
lodged the following reservation:
[I]t will not be bound to assume any costs or expenses resulting from the par-
ticipation of legal counsel or advisers or from court and legal proceedings in
connection with efforts to return children from the United States pursuant to the
Convention except insofar as those costs or expenses are covered by a legal aid
program. 39
Furthermore, although legal fees and court costs are to be borne by the
petitioner unless covered by payments from federal, state, or local legal
assistance programs, courts ordering the return of a child are directed to
charge all of the petitioner's expenses (including court costs and legal
fees) to the respondent "unless the respondent establishes that such order
would be clearly inappropriate." 40 This means that a respondent who fails
to establish a "grave risk" under article 13(b), or one who does establish
a "grave risk," but whose child is ordered returned under a court's discre-
tion to do so, may be required to bear all the petitioner's (and, of course,
the respondent's own) court costs, legal fees, and other expenses. There is
no reciprocal provision for petitioners to pay the expenses of respondents
when a grave risk or other exception to the obligation to return a child is
established.
The petitioner also is offered assistance by nonprofit organizations,
in particular the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
(NCMEC). NCMEC acted as the U.S. Central Authority for incoming
36. See Revision of the Model Application Form Under the Hague Convention of 25
October 1980 on the Civil Aspects ofInternational Child Abduction, Information Document No.
4 (May 2011), available at www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abduct20l 1infoO4e.pdf.
37. Recommendation adopted by the Fourteenth Session: model form to be used in making
applications for the return of wrongfully removed or retained children (2008), available at
www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=publications.details&pid=2778&dtid=28; 22 C.F.R. § 94.5
(1989); Application Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Form of Application, available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/80021.
pdf.
38. 22 C.F.R. § 94.6(e) (1989).
39. United States Reservations to Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, art. 24, 24 (1988), available at www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act=status.com-
ment &csid=652&disp=resdn.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b) (2006).
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cases from 1995 to April 2008, when the OCI took over those functions.
At present, NCMEC maintains the International Child Abduction
Attorney Network (for Convention and non-Convention cases involving
child abduction) and offers a training manual for attorneys representing
petitioners in Hague Convention cases,4 1 including sample pleadings and
filings.42
IV. Leveling the Playing Field
Eliminating or limiting some of the bias described above would help
level the playing field where the parent who has taken or retained the
child alleges domestic violence. Changes might include ensuring that
cases are handled, on both sides, by experienced attorneys who are
trained in Convention cases. An improved attorney registry specific to
Convention cases and made available to both parties would help accom-
plish this goal. Attorneys and judicial officers should also receive train-
ing about issues that are relevant to child abduction, including treatments
for domestic violence.
The most difficult problem for parties and their attorneys in these cases
is assembling the pertinent evidence, which involves providing enough
time, notwithstanding the expediency sought in abduction cases, for
respondents to procure and submit evidence, and improving standardiza-
tion of decision-making by identifying for counsel the sort of evidence
that has proved useful in these cases. A review of cases shows that useful
information can include:
i. Documentation of legal steps taken or attempted in the other coun-
try concerning abuse, including any divorce proceedings in which
abuse is alleged;
ii. Any protective order against petitioner in other country;
iii. Police reports of domestic abuse; hospital records and/or medical
reports of abuse of taking parent or child;
iv. Social services records;
v. Testimony of taking spouse's attorney in other country;
vi. U.S. embassy records of applications for protection;
vii. Any evidence of attempts to limit the mobility of the taking parent;
viii. Witness testimony concerning occurrences of abuse (including
older children's testimony);
41. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, Litigating International Child
Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention, in INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION TRAINING
MANUAL (2012), available at www.missingkids.com/enUS/HagueLitigationGuide/hague-
litigation-guide.pdf.
42. Id. Exhibit H.
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ix. Testimony of children who are old enough to express their own
views of where they should live and why;
x. Affidavit of the taking spouse setting out the events on which the
allegation of abuse is based;
xi. Testimony of witnesses to any perceived effect on children of the
alleged abuse;
xii. Psychologist and/or child expert reports on the effects on the chil-
dren of abuse of the child or parent;
xiii. Any evidence or expert advice that the courts, police and other
authorities of the other country have failed or are unable or unwill-
ing to protect the taking spouse and the children from abuse;
xiv. Evidence as to access to courts, language barriers, and other
impediments for noncitizens.
Another significant step would be to provide free legal counsel to
respondents or at least facilitate the finding of legal aid for respondents as
well as petitioners. The system is currently structured to facilitate legal aid
for petitioners only. The inability of respondents to find and afford legal
assistance can result in widely varying results where appropriate evidence
of alleged abuse is critical and timing is tight.4 3
Another priority should be to provide adequate time in cases where
domestic violence is alleged. A fixed period of delay could be recom-
mended where evidence of abuse must be gathered. Courts should also
standardize their approaches to cases where the respondent seeks refugee
status." In a recent case, for example, a Canadian court found that in the
case of a child who is a refugee (or applying for refugee status), there
should be a rebuttable presumption that the child is at risk of persecution
if returned home.45 Although delaying return under the Convention while
a refugee determination is being made (usually a lengthy process) would
risk thwarting the purposes of the Convention, perhaps refugee cases
could be handled on an expedited basis where an application for return has
43. See Hague Convention on Private International Law, Special Commission on the
Practical Operation of the 1980 and 1996 Hague Conventions (1-10 June 2011), Conclusions
and Recommendations:
33. The Special Commission emphasizes that the difficulty in obtaining legal aid at first
instance or an appeal, or of finding an experienced lawyer for the parties, may result in delays
and may produce adverse effects for the child as well as for the parties. The important role of
the Central Authority in helping an applicant to obtain legal aid quickly or to find experienced
legal representatives is recognized.
44. On this subject, see Norris, supra note 4 (arguing that where asylum is granted on
domestic violence grounds, such determination should be given considerable weight in the
grave risk assessment in a Hague Convention case, and where a claim of asylum has been made
on domestic violence grounds, but not yet adjudicated, the Hague Convention proceeding
should be stayed until the asylum case has been adjudicated).
45. A.M.R.I. v. K.E.R., No. C52822, 2011 (20110602).
310 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 47, Number 2, Summer 2013
also been made.4 6
A more aggressive way of standardizing decisions in Convention cases
where domestic violence is alleged would be to restrict the judicial han-
dling of Convention return cases to federal courts, on the theory that
removing state courts from the responsibility for making these decisions
would reduce the instance of conflicting theories on how to assess such
allegations and would take out of the equation some of the differences in
scheduling problems found in different court systems. International judi-
cial and other conferences have stressed the desirability of limiting the
number of jurisdictions and courts handling these cases in order to
enhance the competence, consistency, and coordination of judges and
practitioners.4 7 Such a change would require amending ICARA, and the
problem of legislative delay makes this a less appealing solution, at least
in the short term. Perhaps an initial step could be to follow the lead of
HCPIL and set up a working group to consider some of these changes and
to establish some guidelines for judges and practitioners for cases where
domestic abuse is claimed.
V. Conclusion
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction was designed to discourage the abduction of children across
international borders and to encourage respect for custody and access
arrangements in countries from which children were abducted. An analy-
sis of this conflict in the United States and abroad shows that not only are
results inconsistent from case to case, but that the policy of preventing
child abduction is often favored at the expense of exposing children to
domestic violence. In short, the Hague Convention, in practice, has unin-
tended consequences as it often does not account for the severe impact on
(typically) women and children who flee abuse. As shown in this article,
there are ways of approaching cases under the Hague Convention to strike
a better balance between discouraging child abduction and protecting
children from domestic violence.
46. This is suggested in Norris, supra note 4.
47. See, e.g., Common Law Judicial Conference on International Parental Child
Abduction, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 2000) (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United
Kingdom and the United States); Judges' Seminar on International Protection of the Child, De
Ruwenberg, (June 2000) (France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands); International Judicial
Seminar on The 1980 Hague Convention on The Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
De Ruwenberg Conference Centre, Netherlands (Oct. 2001) (attended by thirty-one judges from
seven jurisdictions (England and Wales) (2), France (3), Germany (15), Netherlands (2),
Scotland (1), Sweden (3), United States of America (5)); Second Malta Judicial Conference on
Cross-frontier Family Law Issues, Hosted by the Government of Malta in Collaboration with
the Hague Conference on Private International Law (Mar. 2006), available at www.hcch.net.
